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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AN EXCESS OF METHODS: IDENTIFYING IMPLIED
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT

ROBERT C. FARRELL*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s cases on implied fundamental rights have been an
amalgam, if not a hodgepodge, of due process and equal protection reasoning.
The Court’s modern doctrine of implied fundamental rights has grown out of
several historically distinct lines of cases that the Court has selectively used
and selectively ignored. This article examines the provenance of these
different lines of fundamental rights cases, the extent to which they were
originally independent of each other, and the extent to which the Court has
used them interchangeably. 1
Section II of the article will examine the various and somewhat
independent lines of fundamental rights cases that the Court decided before
1960. Section III will illustrate how, beginning in the 1960s, the Court in some
instances began to treat these different lines of precedents as interchangeable
and thus treated the due process and equal protection versions of implied
fundamental rights analysis as roughly equivalent. Section IV will then
examine each of the methods the Court has used to identify implied
fundamental rights under both the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clauses.
* B.A., Trinity College; J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University
School of Law.
1. There is an abundance of scholarly literature on the subject of implied fundamental
rights, a summary of which is well beyond the scope of this article, which will limit itself to a
close and critical examination of the cases, thus focusing on what the Court itself has done. A
sampling of the scholarly theories of constitutional interpretation that would help to explain
where implied fundamental rights come from include (1) natural law, see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-54 (1980); (2) neutral
principles, see id. at 54-60; (3) original intent, see Edwin Meese, III, Toward a Jurisprudence of
Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988); (4) original meaning, see, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 (2001); and
(5) policing the process, see ELY, supra, at 73-104. For an earlier, lengthier, and different
treatment of the sources of implied fundamental rights, see David Crump, How Do the Courts
Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial
Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795 (1995).
203
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II. THE PRE-1960S IMPLIED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CASES
During the years before 1960, when the Court decided cases that would
now likely be said to involve “implied fundamental rights,” it did not use any
standardized terminology and the more recent terms like “implied fundamental
rights,” “strict scrutiny” and “compelling interest” did not appear. Rather, the
Court during this time developed what would eventually become implied
fundamental rights analysis in five independent, unconnected lines of
precedents: (1) the “liberty of contract” cases associated with Lochner v. New
York, 2 (2) the selective incorporation cases, (3) the fundamental rights cases
under the Equal Protection Clause, (4) Snyder v. Massachusetts, which
established the “history and tradition” test, 3 and (5) Rochin v. California,
which established the “shocks the conscience” standard. 4
A.

Lochner and its Progeny

In the earliest of these lines, represented by Lochner v. New York 5 and its
progeny and beginning in 1897, 6 the Court focused on the term “liberty” in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and construed it to include
“freedom of contract.” From this starting point, the Court was very likely to
conclude that any attempt by the state to regulate contractual relations was an
unconstitutional infringement on a protected liberty. This meant that state
statutes setting minimum wages 7 or maximum hours 8 in the workplace or
protecting the right of workers to unionize 9 were presumptively
unconstitutional. The Court in these Lochner-era cases did not use the terms
“fundamental rights” or “strict scrutiny,” but, in its review of these labor
statutes, it used a level of review that was as demanding as implied by the
modern term “strict scrutiny.” Whenever the Court in a Lochner-type case
determined that a statute infringed on a protected “liberty” interest, the statute

2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
4. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. The beginning of the Lochner era is considered to have begun
in 1897, the year in which the Court decided Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)
(invalidating a Louisiana statute that prohibited obtaining insurance on Louisiana property from
an insurer who had not complied with Louisiana law, on the ground that it interfered with liberty
of contract).
7. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating District of Columbia
law requiring minimum wages for women).
8. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45 (invalidating New York law prohibiting employment of bakery
employees for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week).
9. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating Kansas statute that prohibited
employers from requiring employees not to join a union).
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was typically invalidated as a matter of course, usually without measuring the
significance of the government’s interest in regulating that activity. 10
The Lochner-era ended in 1937 when the Court decided West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, a case that upheld a minimum wage statute and specifically
overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 11 a Lochner-type case to the contrary.
As the Parrish Court explained, “The Constitution does not speak of freedom
of contract.” 12 Therefore, the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause
was not an “absolute and uncontrollable” 13 liberty, but rather one subject to
“regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject.” 14 Thus, the Parrish
case effectively ended any kind of rigid scrutiny of government regulation of
business and commercial matters in the name of protecting constitutional
liberty and, if that were the end of the story, the Lochner line of cases would be
of historical significance only.
Mixed in, however, with the typical Lochner case regulating
labor/management relations were two cases in which the state attempted to
regulate parental control over children. In the first of these, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 15 the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages, and in the second, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 16 the Court
invalidated a statute that required parents to send their children to public
schools. The Meyer Court specifically cited Lochner as one of its sources and
then gave an extremely broad definition of “liberty” that went well beyond
Lochner’s. For, according to the Court in Meyer,
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 17

Fourteen years after Meyer, the Court overruled Adkins and in doing so
rejected Lochner’s expansive reading of the term “liberty” in relation to state

10. But there were occasional cases to the contrary. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423
(1908) (upholding a maximum hour law for women because a woman’s “physical structure” put
her at a disadvantage); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917) (upholding a maximum hour
day for factory workers).
11. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
(1923)).
12. Id. at 391.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 262 U.S. 390, 396-397 (1923).
16. 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
17. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

206

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:203

regulation of business contracts. 18 It was not immediately clear how that
overruling would affect Meyer and Pierce, with their broad reading of the term
“liberty” in the context of family relations. Time would tell that Meyer and
Pierce did survive Parrish, and thus this one part of the Lochner line of cases
is still considered relevant precedent for today’s implied fundamental rights
cases.
B.

Selective Incorporation

At the same time that the Court was exalting freedom of contract in the
Lochner line of cases, it was also deciding an independent and entirely separate
set of Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” cases–those involving the selective
incorporation against the states of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights,
which by their terms were applicable only against the federal government.
During this time, a majority of the Court never adopted the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the entire Bill of
Rights. 19 Thus, the Court needed a principle to explain which of those
protections were incorporated against the states and which were not. In 1937,
just nine months after Parrish, the Court in Palko v. Connecticut announced
such a principle–that the term “liberty” included only those rights that were
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 20Under this principle, the Court
would look at each provision of the Bill of Rights and decide whether or not
that particular provision was “implicit in concept of ordered liberty.” 21
Although the Court was deciding these selective incorporation cases during the
same time frame as it was deciding the Lochner precedents, the two lines of
cases operated independently of each other. Palko, for example, did not cite
any of the Lochner precedents. Since there are a finite number of protections
in the Bill of Rights, the selective incorporation cases are something of a
closed universe, and they too, like the Lochner cases, might be merely of
historical interest. Nevertheless, just as one element of the generally discarded
Lochner world view has survived in Meyer and Pierce, so one element of the
selective incorporation cases survives, that is, Palko’s “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty” test, which the Court continues to cite today.
C. Implied Fundamental Rights Under the Equal Protection Clause
Independent of these two lines of cases (the Lochner and the selective
incorporation lines), the Court during the 1940s began a third line of
fundamental rights cases, this one under the Equal Protection Clause. In 1942,
18. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
19. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 58 (1947) (rejecting total incorporation).
20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see infra Section IV.B.1 for a further
discussion of the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” standard.
21. Id. at 325.
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just five years after it had decided Parrish and Palko, the Court in Skinner v.
Oklahoma 22 considered the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute that
provided for the sterilization of felons convicted three times of felonies
involving “moral turpitude.” 23 This factual setting was an obvious candidate
for some kind of heightened scrutiny given the significance and permanence of
the state’s decision to sterilize. In fact, the language in Meyer about protecting
the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” 24 would have been
an obvious precedent to cite in support of an argument that sterilization by the
state invaded a protected liberty interest. The Court, however, had just
overruled that Lochner-kind of reasoning, at least with regard to government
regulation of commerce, and the continuing status of Meyer and Pierce was
unclear. Thus, instead of reopening the controversial question about what
exactly is contained within the due process concept of “liberty,” the Court
decided Skinner as an equal protection case, since the Oklahoma legislature
had not treated all three-time felons the same. 25
The Court then needed to address how strictly it ought to apply the equal
protection mandate. Since this was not a due process case, the Court did not
need to concern itself with the intricacies of the term “liberty.” 26 Without
reference to any provision of the Constitution, the Court announced that
procreation was “one of the basic civil rights of man,” “fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race,” and that the Oklahoma statute would
thus be subject to “strict scrutiny.” 27 With these words, the Court in Skinner
effectively created the equal protection version of implied fundamental rights
reasoning. In the years following Skinner, the Court used implied fundamental
rights analysis under the Equal Protection Clause to find that there was a
fundamental right to vote in state elections 28 and a fundamental right to some
level of access to the criminal process in the courts. 29 Until the 1960s, these
implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause tended to
ignore the “liberty” precedents of the Lochner-era and of the selective
incorporation cases, but they tended similarly to lead to invalidation.
D. Snyder and the History and Traditions Test
In addition to these three principal pre-1960s lines of cases, two additional
kinds of fundamental rights precedents arose in the area of criminal procedure

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942).
Id. at 535-37.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-541.
See generally id.
Id. at 541.
See infra Section IV.F.1.
See infra Section IV.F.2.
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but outside of the selective incorporation line. In the first of these, the 1934
case of Snyder v. Massachusetts, 30 the Court considered the claim that a
criminal defendant had been denied the right to accompany the jury when it
went to visit the scene of the crime. The Court, in rejecting his due process
challenge, adopted the test that “liberty” includes only those principles of
justice “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.” 31 This “traditions” test, although slightly reformulated as a
“history and tradition” test by more recent cases, 32 has become one of the
Court’s modern due process tests.
E.

Rochin and the Shocks the Conscience Test

Finally, in 1952, in Rochin v. California, 33 a case in which the police had
arranged to have a suspect’s stomach pumped in order to find evidence of
illegal drugs, the Court announced that government conduct that “shocks the
conscience” would constitute an invasion of a constitutionally protected
liberty. 34 This “shocks the conscience” standard, although ignored by the
Court for many years, has recently been revived as a test of the constitutionally
protected liberty interest. 35 As the 1960s arrived, the Court had decided
implied fundamental rights precedents in five separate lines of cases. The
terminology used in these cases was not standardized. The Lochner and the
selective incorporation cases focused on the term “liberty.” In the equal
protection cases, the Court did use the terms “fundamental right” and “strict
scrutiny,” but made no reference to “liberty.” The “traditions” and the “shocks
the conscience” tests were waiting in the background. In the meantime, the
general process of using the term “liberty” to impose substantive limitations on
government would come to be called “substantive due process.” 36
III. THE SELECTIVE EQUIVALENCE AND INTERCHANGEABILITY OF DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION PRECEDENTS IN IMPLIED FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS CASES
As noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court has decided implied
fundamental rights cases under both the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before 1960, however, the Court
treated these lines of precedent as independent of each other. Beginning in the

30. 291 U.S. 97, 103 (1934).
31. Id. at 105.
32. See infra, Section IV.C.
33. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
34. Id. at 172.
35. See infra Section IV.D.
36. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court.”).
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1960s, however, the Court, when it suited its purposes, began on occasion to
treat the due process and equal protection precedents as interchangeable. To
the extent that fundamental rights themselves under the two Clauses are
interchangeable, suggested that the methods for identifying those rights under
the two Clauses would also be interchangeable. Thus, any thorough
examination of the methods of identifying implied fundamental rights under
either of the Clauses must take into account the methods of identifying them
under the other Clause as well. These parallel examinations will lead to the
conclusion that the Court uses a multiplicity of methods in identifying implied
fundamental rights. This Section, then, will demonstrate how the Court has in
certain contexts engrafted the due process and equal protection cases onto each
other.
Before illustrating that point, it should first be noted that it is not obvious
why there is any need to use both the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clauses to identify neither implied fundamental rights nor that suggests why
the two Clauses would be interchangeable. At a theoretical and conceptual
level, these two Clauses are quite distinct and impose different types of limits
on governmental conduct. Thus, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which says that a state may not “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,” has both a procedural and a
substantive aspect. 37 Under the doctrine of procedural due process, the state
may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without notice and a
hearing. 38 The doctrine of substantive due process imposes substantive limits
on government whenever government action interferes with activity that is
within a protected interest defined as “life,” “liberty” or “property.” 39 On the
other hand, the Equal Protection Clause, which says that the state may not deny
to any person the “equal protection of the laws,” imposes no substantive limits
on government. 40 It works rather as a comparative limitation on government
classifications–thus it requires that those similarly situated be treated
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (“Procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . This court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an
individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”).
39. Where no fundamental right is involved, this “substantive” limitation on government is
in fact virtually no limitation at all, for a governmental restriction on a non-fundamental right
need satisfy only the very deferential test of being “rationally related to legitimate government
interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). This is a standard that
invariably leads to the conclusion that the contested restriction is constitutional. On the other
hand, where the government restricts a fundamental right, under the doctrine of substantive due
process a much more demanding scrutiny is used. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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similarly. 41 Where the Court finds that a classification infringes on an implied
fundamental right, it will examine that classification with a more demanding
scrutiny. 42
Thus, it initially seems that the two Clauses work in quite different ways–
the first a substantive principle protecting life, liberty, and property, and the
second a comparative equality principle that has no substantive content of its
own. Notwithstanding the initial plausibility of that distinction, however, with
regard to the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has in
certain instances treated the two doctrines as equivalent and interchangeable.
Thus, the Court commonly cites implied fundamental rights equal protection
cases in support of due process conclusions and implied fundamental rights
due process cases in support of equal protection conclusions. This overlap
between the doctrines is exemplified in Roe v. Wade 43 and in a long line of
marriage cases where the Court has gone back and forth between due process
and equal protection analysis. 44
In Roe, as a substantive matter, the Court established the constitutional
principle that the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause includes a right of
privacy that “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.” 45 In addition to the substance of its holding,
however, the Court in Roe made clear that, when it served its purposes, it
would treat the due process and equal protection cases as interchangeable. 46
Thus, the Court in Roe began by conceding the obvious–that “[t]he

41. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for
men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
42. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (finding that where any
classification serves to penalize the exercise of a constitutional right, it must be shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest in order to be constitutional). This brief
summary of the differences between due process and equal protection reasoning does suggest one
basic difference between fundamental rights analyses under the two Clauses. When the Court
finds that a right is fundamental under the Due Process Clause, it is clear that the implied right
comes directly out of the Due Process Clause, that is, from its protection of “liberty.” On the
other hand, to speak of an implied fundamental right “arising under” the Equal Protection Clause
is technically inaccurate since that Clause creates no substantive rights. Rather, when the Court
speaks of an implied fundamental right in an equal protection case, it is finding a freestanding
implied fundamental right–that is, a right independent of the term “liberty” in the Due Process
Clause and independent of any other explicit provision in the Constitution–and then imposing a
very strict comparative standard of equality on classifications that infringe on such an implied
right. What this means is that implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection
Clause inevitably involve rights implied from somewhere other than the Equal Protection Clause.
43. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 46-74.
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
46. Id. at 152.
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Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” 47 Then, in
support of its assertion that there was nevertheless a constitutionally protected
right of privacy, the Court cited “a line of decisions . . . going back perhaps as
far as [1891] . . . [in which] the Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution.” 48 The Court then followed this assertion with a citation to a
string of cases that supported the claim. 49 The cited cases included: (1) from
the implied fundamental rights precedents of the Lochner era, both Meyer and
Pierce, although significantly, Lochner itself and its “freedom of contract”
relatives were omitted; (2) from the selective incorporation cases, Palko, with
its reference to “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty;” and (3) from the
cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause, both Skinner and Eisenstadt v.
Baird. 50 The citation to Eisenstadt is particularly good evidence of the
interlocking of due process and equal protection cases. Eisenstadt was a 1971
case that provided the essential link between Griswold v. Connecticut, 51 the
first of the modern privacy cases, and Roe v. Wade. In Griswold, the Court had
invalidated a Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by a
married couple, on the ground that it invaded a fundamental right of marital
privacy arising from the “penumbras formed by emanations” from particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 52 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt, the Court
reviewed a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons and invalidated it as a matter of equal
protection. 53 Without deciding exactly what the constitutional right of access
to contraceptives is, the Eisenstadt Court insisted that “the rights must be the
same for the unmarried and the married alike.” 54 Then, in the course of
explaining why the right was the same for both, despite the obvious difference
between married and unmarried couples that had appeared to be so important
in Griswold, the Court described this right of privacy in words that would
become the foundation of Roe v. Wade. The Court stated: “If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 55 As Roe
would very shortly make clear, the right to decide whether to bear a child

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484; see infra Section IV.E.2.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
Id.
Id. (emphasis removed).
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would necessarily include within it the right to decide not to bear a child. 56
Thus Eisenstadt, an equal protection case, is the essential link between
Griswold and Roe, the two most significant privacy cases the Court has
decided.
The Court in Roe made an additional contribution to the interchangeability
of implied fundamental rights cases under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses in terms of the appropriate test to be applied. The Roe
Court stated, “Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling
state interest.’” 57 With these words, the Court equated the due process and
equal protection tests for review of implied fundamental rights. 58 As noted
above, the Lochner era decisions of the Court did in fact apply a very
demanding level of scrutiny as did the selective incorporation cases, but it was
not until Shapiro v. Thompson 59 in 1969 (an equal protection case) and Roe in
1973 (a due process case) that fundamental rights cases under due process and
equal protection were subject to the same “compelling interest” test.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Roe, made clear both that the majority had
in fact equated the two tests and that he disagreed with that result. According
to Rehnquist, “the Court adds a new wrinkle to this [compelling state interest]
test by transposing it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to this case arising under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . accomplish[ing] the
seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it
found it.” 60 Whether or not Justice Rehnquist’s disapproval is deserved, he did
accurately state what the Roe majority had done. 61 Thus, the Court in Roe
made clear that the different strands of implied fundamental rights cases were
sufficiently close to a core principle that it was appropriate to cite them
interchangeably and that the Court would apply the same “compelling interest”
test to both due process and equal protection cases.
This interchangeability and equivalence of implied fundamental rights
reasoning under due process and equal protection reasoning is further
illustrated in the Supreme Court opinions on marriage as a fundamental right.
In 1923, in Meyer, the Court had found that the right to marry was part of the
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. 62 In 1942, in Skinner, the Court
56. See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. 410 U.S. at 155 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 46.
59. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (insisting that “any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of [a constitutional right], unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”) (emphasis removed).
60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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found, without any reference to “liberty” in the Due Process Clause or to
Meyer itself, that as a matter of equal protection marriage is fundamental. 63 In
1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 64 which was neither a due process nor an
equal protection decision, marriage was described as part of “a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights–older than our political parties, older than our
school system . . . an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.” 65 In 1967, in Loving v. Virginia, 66 the Court invalidated
Virginia’s prohibition on interracial marriage on both an equal protection
ground (because of its racial classification) and also a due process ground
(because “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 67).
And what authority did the Loving Court cite for this claim that the Due
Process Clause included a fundamental right to marry? Why Skinner v.
Oklahoma, of course, that very relevant equal protection case.
Four years later, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 68 the Court found that the
imposition of certain court and filing fees that restricted the plaintiffs in their
effort to bring an action for divorce violated the Due Process Clause. 69 In
setting forth the theoretical framework under which the case would be decided,
the Court said, “As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized,
marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society.” 70 In support of
this assertion, the Court cited what were now becoming the old standbys–
Loving, Skinner, and Meyer, 71 thus once again moving back and forth between
due process and equal protection without even appearing to notice. Citing the
state’s monopolization of the process for entering into and terminating the
fundamental right of marriage, the Court concluded that “a State may not,
consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship
without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing
so.” 72
In 1978, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 73 the Court’s opinion demonstrated how
completely interlocked were its due process and equal protection precedents as
they applied to the fundamental right to marriage. In that case, the Court

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See infra text accompanying notes 84-85.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 486.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383.
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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invalidated a Wisconsin statute under which the state would not grant a
marriage license to an applicant with outstanding child support orders unless
he had received permission from a court. 74 The Supreme Court treated the
case as arising under the Equal Protection Clause, 75 and its chain of citations
demonstrating that marriage is a fundamental right included, inter alia, Loving,
Skinner, Meyer, and Griswold. 76 Once the Court had determined that the
statute infringed on the right to marry and would thus be strictly scrutinized,
invalidation followed quickly. Since the Court was using an equal protection
analysis, it needed to identify a class of persons treated differently from
another class without adequate justification. The Court did so by identifying
“a certain class of Wisconsin residents [who] may not marry . . . without first
obtaining a court order granting permission to marry.” 77 By inference, the
comparison class was everyone else in Wisconsin who did not need a court
order to get married. The Court determined that there were other ways for the
state to accomplish its statutory goals and thus determined that the statute did
not survive heightened scrutiny. 78
Justice Stewart concurred in the result in Zablocki, but his refusal to join
the majority opinion is instructive on the relationship of fundamental rights
analysis under the due process and equal protection clauses. Justice Stewart
conceded that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause. 79 According
to Stewart, however, the Equal Protection Clause was not relevant to the matter
before the Court since:
Like almost any law, the Wisconsin statute now before us affects some people
and does not affect others. But to say that it thereby creates ‘classifications’ in
the equal protection sense strikes me as little short of fantasy. The problem in
this case is not one of discriminatory classifications, but of unwarranted
encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom. I think that the
Wisconsin statute is unconstitutional because it exceeds the bounds of
permissible state regulation of marriage, and invades the sphere of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 80

As a matter of logic, there is much to recommend of Justice Stewart’s
analysis, for at a conceptual level there surely ought to be a difference between
the substantive protection of liberty under due process and the comparative
74. Id. at 375-77.
75. Id. at 382.
76. Id. at 383-84.
77. Id. at 375.
78. Id. at 388-91. (finding that the classification was not sufficiently correlated with either of
the statute’s twin purposes of providing counseling about the need to fulfill support obligations or
of protecting the welfare of the out-of-custody child).
79. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 393 (Stewart, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 391-92.
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protection of classes under equal protection. Stewart’s view was expressed
only in a concurring opinion, however, and is quite inconsistent with what the
majority did in Zablocki and with what the Court has done in the other cases
discussed in this section.
Before leaving this section on the interchangeability of due process and
equal protection precedents in the Supreme Court, one major qualification is in
order. The interchangeability goes to the Court’s initial identification of the
implied fundamental right. It does not carry over into the mode of analysis
once that right has been identified. This difference arises because, as noted
supra, 81 fundamental rights cases under the Due Process Clause are
substantive, involving state interference with a protected “liberty” interest,
while fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause are
comparative, involving the nonsubstantive claim that, if the state treats one
person a certain way, it has to treat similarly situated persons that way too.
This distinction is quite clear in the Court’s precedents. If Skinner, for
example, had been a due process opinion decided after Roe v. Wade, the Court
would probably have concluded that, since a policy of sterilization affected the
implied fundamental right of procreation, the state could never sterilize any
individual person without a compelling interest. The Skinner Court’s actual
equal protection opinion was more limited. In effect, it said that, if the state
wanted to sterilize anyone who has three times committed felonies involving
moral turpitude, then it must sterilize all such felons. 82 The problem with the
Oklahoma sterilization statute was a comparative one, that is, its selectively
different treatment of those similarly situated.
Other implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause
also illustrate this kind of comparative reasoning. In Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections, 83 the Court was addressing the question of whether or not a
poll tax implicated an implied fundamental right to vote. 84 One obvious
problem with this line of argument was the fact that, as the Court noted, “the
right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned [in the
Constitution].” 85 Since states in some instances do not have to hold elections
at all, it would be difficult, as a matter of due process, to insist that the right to
vote in state elections is fundamental. But in fact, states have chosen to select
most office holders through a popular vote. And thus, as a matter of equal
protection, “it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the

81. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
82. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543. This appears to be the meaning of the Court’s statement that
the constitutional difficulty with the statute might be addressed either by “enlarging on the one
hand or contracting on the other . . . the class of criminals who might be sterilized.”
83. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
84. Id. at 665.
85. Id.
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electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 86 As in Skinner, the
comparative nature of the equal protection mandate means that, if the state
wants to deprive certain individuals of the right to vote, it has to treat everyone
that way.
Griffin v. Illinois 87 is one further illustration of this kind of comparative
equal protection reasoning in implied fundamental rights cases. In Griffin, the
Court considered the claim that a person convicted at a criminal trial but
unable to pay for a transcript needed for an appeal was entitled to have that
transcript provided by the state without charge. 88 The problem with such a
claim was that, as the Court pointed out, “a State is not required by the Federal
Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.” 89
Thus, it seems that the complainant in Griffin would have a difficult time
claiming a constitutional right to such a transcript. The state, however, had
created a system of appellate courts and had provided for a system of appellate
review. Thus, as in Harper, as a matter of comparative equal protection, the
Court was able to say that, once a state had created such a system, it could not
grant appellate review “in a way that discriminates against some convicted
defendants on account of their poverty.” 90
Thus, although the nature of the scrutiny applied to state infringement of
implied fundamental rights issues is different under the Equal Protection and
the Due Process Clauses, the Court on occasion considers the cases to be
interchangeable in terms of identifying those implied fundamental rights.
IV. THE DIFFERENT METHODS THE SUPREME COURT HAS USED TO IDENTIFY
IMPLIED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
This Section will examine the different methods, under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, that the Court has used to identify implied
fundamental rights. Specifically, the Court has recognized certain rights as
fundamental because (A) they are important; (B) they are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution; (C)
they are deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition; (D) they need
protection from government action that shocks the conscience; (E) they are
necessarily implied from the structure of government or from the structure of
the Constitution; (F) they provide necessary access to governmental processes;
and (G) previous Supreme Court precedents so identify them.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. 383 U.S. at 665.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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Because They Are Important

The simplest and most straightforward method the Court has used to
identify an implied fundamental right is to ask–How important is the claimed
right? In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court decided the first of its
implied fundamental rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause. 91 The
Court determined that it would apply a more demanding scrutiny to a law that
authorized the sterilization of felons who had been convicted three times of
felonies involving moral turpitude. 92 Why the heightened scrutiny? The Court
explained,
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle,
far reaching and devastating effects. . . .We advert to [these matters] merely in
emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State
makes in a sterilization law is essential. 93

Note first what is not here. Because this is not a due process analysis, there is
no need to attach the fundamental right to procreate to the term “liberty.”
There is no reference to rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and
no reference to anything being “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
tradition.” There is no attempt to infer the implied right from any other
provision of the Constitution, from the structure of the federal government, or
from the structure of the Constitution itself. There is simply a bold assertion,
based on an incontrovertible fact of human existence, that procreation is
fundamental because it is essential “to the very existence and survival of the
race.” 94 In short, the test of whether or not a right is fundamental seems to be a
simple matter–how important it is.
Unfortunately, the simplicity of this test has the effect of proving too
much. If a right is fundamental for constitutional purposes because of its
importance to the survival of the human race, then basic claims to food,
clothing, and shelter would also seem to be fundamental as well. And what
about education, which the Supreme Court called “the most important function
of state and local governments?” 95
However, the Court has rejected attempts to extend Skinner beyond its
factual setting and, in the course of doing so, has treated the Skinner precedent
in a very ambivalent manner. On the one hand, the Court continues to cite

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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Skinner on a very regular basis in some of its most important cases, 96 thus
suggesting that it is a very viable and current precedent, at least for the
substance of its holding that procreation is a fundamental right. Yet, at the
same time, the Court has rejected the Skinner Court method for determining
that procreation is a fundamental right. Thus, for example, in the 1970 case of
Dandridge v. Williams, 97 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to
Maryland’s welfare program. 98 When determining the proper level of review,
the Court noted how significant were the welfare grants that were the subject
of the suit and described those grants as among “the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings.” 99 For all that, the Court neither cited
Skinner nor made any reference to its method of finding rights fundamental
because of their connection to the “existence and survival of the race.” Rather,
the Court said simply, “the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no
power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic
or social policy.” 100 Thus, the Court upheld the state’s challenged calculations
of financial need in the welfare program under a very deferential standard: “A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.” 101
Two years later, in the 1972 case of Lindsey v. Normet, 102 the Court
considered an equal protection challenge to Oregon’s summary process for
evicting tenants, a procedure that was much speedier than other civil actions
and much more limited in terms of the issues that could be raised. 103 The
plaintiffs who challenged that process argued for heightened scrutiny since
“the ‘need for decent shelter’ and the ‘right to retain peaceful possession of
one’s home’ are fundamental interests which are particularly important to the
poor and which may be trenched upon only after the State demonstrates some
superior interest.” 104 This is the kind of reasoning that the Court used in
Skinner, but this time the Court rejected the claim, saying, “We do not
denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of

96. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
97. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 486.
101. Id. at 485 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)).
102. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
103. Id. at 73.
104. Id.
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access to dwellings of a particular quality.” 105 The Court went on to use a very
deferential form of review and uphold the summary process action. 106
The Lindsey Court made no mention of Skinner, so there was no need to
distinguish Skinner’s reasoning. Further, the Court made the telling reference
to its inability to perceive “in that document” (referring to the Constitution)
any constitutional guarantee of housing. 107 Of course, it ought not to be
surprising that an alleged implied fundamental right will not be found “in that
document.” By definition, an implied fundamental right will not be found
explicitly in the Constitution itself. Further, as a matter of loyalty to precedent,
the Court in Lindsey was overlooking the fact that the Court in Skinner
likewise could not have found “in that document” a right to procreate. But the
Lindsey opinion was consistent with the Court’s views in Dandridge, and it
also served as a bridge to the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 108 in which the Court appeared to bury the Skinner
methodology.
In Rodriguez, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to the
method of financing public schools in Texas through local property taxes. 109
The effect of this method was to produce great disparities in per pupil spending
in different school districts. 110 The plaintiffs in this suit argued that the Court
should strictly scrutinize these disparities since the right to education with
which they interfered, was a fundamental one. 111 The Court’s initial response
appeared to be very favorable to the plaintiffs and consistent with Skinner. 112
The Court conceded that “education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments,” 113 that it “is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities,” 114 and that it is “the foundation of good
citizenship.” 115 Ultimately, however, in terms of the standard of review that
the Court would apply, none of that mattered, for “the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection
Clause.” 116

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30.
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What then was the test? According to the Court,
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in
the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to
discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is
as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. 117

Since this new Rodriguez test directly conflicted with the method the Court
had followed in Skinner, one might have expected the Court to overrule or
distinguish Skinner. Surprisingly, the Court cited Skinner as supporting
authority for its claim that the true test of a fundamental right was not its
societal significance but whether it was “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.” 118 This turns the Skinner holding on its head. The Court
attempted to explain this away with the claim that “[i]mplicit in the Court’s
opinion [in Skinner] is the recognition that the right of procreation is among
the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitution. See Roe v.
Wade.” 119 This purported explanation is entirely unconvincing. The Skinner
opinion, of course, had nothing to do with privacy, nothing to do with liberty,
nothing to do with the Due Process Clause, and could not possibly have
envisioned the Court’s due process opinion forty-one years later in Roe. The
Court in Skinner, of course, had made no attempt to ground the fundamental
right to procreate in any language in the Constitution, but the Rodriguez Court
saw a very different Skinner.
The absolute nature of the language in Rodriguez and its outright rejection
of “societal significance” as relevant to the search for implied fundamental
rights would seem to have put an end to the matter. It didn’t. Twelve years
later, in Plyler v. Doe, 120 the Court once again reviewed under the Equal
Protection Clause a Texas statute that limited access to education. 121 This time
the statute authorized local school districts to deny free public school education
to the children of undocumented aliens. 122 After Rodriguez, it might be
expected that the Court would find that the statute implicated no fundamental
right and thus would uphold it with minimal scrutiny. In fact, the Court
initially paid lip service to Rodriguez, stating that “[p]ublic education is not a

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34 & n.76.
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457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 221.
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‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.” 123 But then the Court
added,
But neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in
maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on
the life of the child, mark the distinction . . . . In sum, education has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. 124

Having thus announced the importance of education, the Court adopted a
somewhat heightened level of scrutiny and invalidated the statute. 125
This method of weighing the value of education that the Plyler Court used
sounds quite a bit like a test of “societal significance,” without any reference to
the text of the Constitution. Thus, the original Skinner test–it’s fundamental
because it’s important–is not really dead. But Plyler seems to be the only
post-Skinner case to apply it. Justice Marshall has argued that the importance
of an interest should be considered as part of a balancing test he would use in
place of the rigid three tiers of review under the Equal Protection Clause. 126
As part of Marshall’s balancing, the Court would consider “the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits that they do not receive.” 127 The Court has never
adopted Justice Marshall’s view.
B.

Because They Are Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty or Implicitly
Guaranteed by the Constitution

At two different times, in two different kinds of cases, the Court has
adopted a test for finding implied fundamental rights that is so circular and
empty that it is hard to believe it has had any staying power. Nevertheless, it
has. This is a test that answers a question–what fundamental rights should be
implied from the Constitution–by repeating the question: implicit rights are
those that are implicit in the Constitution. This “implicit” test has both a due
process and an equal protection version.

123. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35).
124. Id. at 221.
125. Rather than invoke the traditional, very deferential, rationality test, the Court said that
“the discrimination contained in the [challenged statute] can hardly be considered rational unless
it furthers some substantial goal of the State.” Id. at 224. This standard is quite similar to the
intermediate scrutiny that the Court applies to gender classifications, that is, that “classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
126. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 99.
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1. “Implicit in the Concept of Ordered Liberty” and the Due Process
Clause
In 1937, in Palko v. Connecticut, 128 a selective incorporation case, the
Court was deciding the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment’s right to be free
of double jeopardy was to be incorporated as part of the “liberty” protected
against the states by the Due Process Clause. 129 The Court determined that it
was not, because that right was not “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” 130 and thus abolishing it would not “violate a ‘principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.’” 131 The Court distinguished the protection against double
jeopardy from a set of rights-freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free
exercise of religion, right of peaceable assembly, and the right of one accused
of a crime to the benefit of counsel–all of which the Court had already
incorporated against the states 132 and were thus presumptively “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.” On the other hand, the Court found that the
protection against double jeopardy was quite similar to another set of rights-the
protection against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right not
to be prosecuted without an indictment–all of which the Court at that time had
not incorporated against the states 133 and which were thus presumptively not
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” In response to the obvious-that
there is no clear distinction between these two sets of rights-the Court
explained that its distinctions were not simply “a hasty catalogue of the cases
on the one side and the other [of the line of division],” 134 but rather were the
product of “a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a proper
order and coherence.” 135
Examination of the rationale in Palko makes it very difficult to find the
“rationalizing principle [that gives] a proper order and coherence.” 136 The
most obvious flaw in the Court’s rationalizing principle is that, in circular
fashion, it simply repeats the question that it was supposed to answer. In
purporting to answer the question of how we identify implied fundamental
rights under the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause, the Court’s answer is
to identify those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” It does not
appear that the Court has advanced the discussion at all by going from the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

302 U. S. 319 (1937).
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325.
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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word “implied” to “implicit.” All it has added beyond a rephrasing of the
question is the term “ordered.” The Court did not explain how the modifier
“ordered” limited the scope of what would otherwise be included in
“unmodified” liberty or whether it was attempting to exclude a category of
rights that could only be part of a “disordered” liberty.
Beyond the circularity and emptiness of the Palko test, the substantive
problem with Palko was the Court’s unsupported assumption that it was
capable of distinguishing, in a logically consistent way, those rights that are
implicit in ordered liberty from those rights that are not. While the Court in
Palko in 1937 was quite certain that the right to be free of double jeopardy was
on the wrong side of the “implicit” line, thirty-two years later, the Supreme
Court reached just the opposite result in Benton v. Maryland. 137 In that case,
the Court decided that the Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy
was in fact part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and,
so finding, expressly overruled Palko. 138 The Benton Court not only reversed
the specific result in Palko, with regard to double jeopardy, but also asserted
that “Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which this
Court’s recent decisions have rejected.” 139 Further, the Court noted, “Our
recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional
rights can be denied by states as long as the totality of the circumstances does
not disclose a denial of ‘fundamental fairness.’” 140 Finally, the Court made
clear that the right to be free from double jeopardy is “clearly fundamental to
the American scheme of justice.” 141
Benton is thus a thorough rejection both of the specific holding in Palko
(that double jeopardy is not part of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause)
and of its general “approach to basic constitutional rights.” The very fact that
Palko was subsequently overruled, and the resulting anomaly that double
jeopardy was considered not to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty in
1937 but had become so by 1968, suggest that Palko’s assumption that one can
confidently make such distinctions is unwarranted. Yet Palko lives on.
In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 142 the Court considered whether a
Georgia sodomy statute infringed the fundamental right of privacy that is part
of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause. 143 The Court wanted to “assure
itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the
Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’
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395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Id. at 794.
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Id. at 795.
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own choice of values.” 144 To demonstrate that its own decision in Bowers was
not such an imposition of a personal value judgment but rather the result of a
rule of law, the Court cited, as one of its two methods, 145 Palko and its
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” test. Conveniently, the Court
ignored the fact that Palko had been overruled and that this overruling
demonstrated the emptiness of its test. The Bowers Court then, alluding to
“ancient roots” of proscriptions against sodomy, concluded that “to claim that
a right to engage in such conduct is . . . ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’ is, at best, facetious.” 146 On reading this explanation of “liberty,” one
cannot help but be reminded of Justice Stewart’s constitutional test for
identifying pornography–“I know it when I see it.” 147
Since Bowers, the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” test occurs
occasionally in Supreme Court opinions, 148 often paired with the “history and
traditions” test discussed below, 149 but it has no more substance now than it
had in Palko or Bowers.
2. “Implicitly Guaranteed by the Constitution” and the Equal Protection
Clause
The Court has also used an “implicit” test under the Equal Protection
Clause. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 150 a case
decided on equal protection grounds, the Court rejected “societal significance”
as the test for a fundamental right and then announced a new test–whether a
right is “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.” 151 The same
criticisms of circularity and emptiness directed at the Palko test are equally
applicable here. Since the question is one of implied fundamental rights, then,
by definition, the right at issue will not be found explicitly in the Constitution.
As with the Palko test, to say that a right is implied because it is “implicit”
does not work.
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez did suggest one test that might have saved the
“implicitly guaranteed” test–that the implied right be tethered to specific
provisions of the Constitution. 152 Specifically, the test of whether or not a
right was “implicitly guaranteed” could be measured by how closely connected

144. Id. at 191.
145. The other method was the “history and tradition” test. See infra Section IV.C.
146. Id. at 194.
147. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
148. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
149. See infra Section IV.C.
150. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
151. Id. at 33.
152. Id. at 35.
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the alleged right was to an existing, explicit constitutional right. 153 The Court
had already engaged in this kind of reasoning under the First Amendment
when it had found that there is an implied right of association, a right that is
not explicitly created by the Constitution but which the Court has found to be
so closely connected to freedom of speech that it is necessarily implied. 154
According to the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, an implied right to education was
similarly connected to the right of free speech and the right to vote since one
could not effectively exercise those rights without an education. 155 The Court
rejected that argument on the ground that “we have never presumed to possess
either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective
speech or the most informed electoral choice.” 156 Thus education is not
fundamental. 157 Since Rodriguez, the Court occasionally makes reference to
the “implicitly guaranteed” test, 158 but it has had no significant effect on Court
decisions.
C. Because They Are Deeply Rooted in the Nation’s History and Tradition
The Court has sometimes insisted that the test of whether or not a right is
fundamental is to be determined by whether or not it is rooted in our Nation’s
history and traditions. For Justice Scalia, this is the only proper test of a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. This section examines the
Court’s use of this test.
1. The Supreme Court Precedents
In 1934, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 159 the Court considered a defendant’s
appeal of a murder conviction. 160 During the trial, the court had allowed the
jury to visit the scene of the crime but had not allowed the defendant to
accompany the jury. 161 The defendant argued that this denial of his request

153. Id. (“Specifically, [appellees] insist that education is itself a fundamental personal right
because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent
utilization of the right to vote.”).
154. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (“We need not, in order to find
constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by the
record . . . subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech,
petition, or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”).
155. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
156. Id. at 36.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, n.10 (1977).
159. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
160. Id. at 105.
161. Id.
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amounted to an unconstitutional denial of due process. 162 The Supreme Court
rejected that claim and affirmed the conviction and, in the course of doing so,
stated what has become one of the standard tests for identifying implied
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause. 163 The Court said that the
determination of proper court procedures was ordinarily a matter for state
government “unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”164
The Snyder case could easily have fit within the framework of what we now
call procedural due process, since it was a challenge to the procedures used at
trial, but the Court in Snyder did not bother with such fine distinctions and thus
established an appeal to “traditions” as a test of a fundamental right. 165
This 1934 “traditions” test was revitalized beginning in the 1970s with
Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 166 In that case, the Court considered a city
ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single
family and then defined the term “single-family” very narrowly. 167 The effect
of this ordinance was that a grandmother was not able to live in her home with
her son and two grandsons, since the grandsons were cousins rather than
brothers. 168 In a plurality opinion, Justice Powell stated that, under the Due
Process Clause, there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.” 169 The key question, though was how to ascertain what was within this
“private realm” and thus beyond the reach of state regulation?The Court noted
the need to be cautious, for “[s]ubstantive due process has at times been a
treacherous field for this Court,” 170 and “the history of the Lochner era” 171
demonstrated the danger of Justices looking to the Due Process Clause and
finding their own predilections. There was, however, a method that the Court
said would limit the ability of individual Justices to read their own views into
the Constitution–that is, the Constitution protects only those values “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 172
The Court then went on to apply the “history and tradition” test.
According to the Court,
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105.
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
Id. at 502.
Id.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
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especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children
has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition. . . . Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a
decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated
wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our
history, that supports a larger conception of the family. 173

Once the Court had determined that the living arrangement at issue in Moore
was part of a protected liberty interest, it did not even ask whether there was
sufficient state justification, compelling or otherwise, to save it. Instead, the
Court simply concluded that “the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns.” 174 As far as explaining how it knew what
were the relevant traditions that it ought to consider, the Court was silent. It
simply asserted, without supporting citation, its own view of the tradition of
the extended family. 175
Probably the most significant case to adopt the “history and tradition” test
was Bowers v. Hardwick, 176 a 1986 case in which the Court upheld a Georgia
sodomy statute against a due process attack. 177 After citing both the “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty” test discussed above, 178 and the “history and
tradition” test from Moore v. East Cleveland, 179 the Court quickly concluded
that neither formulation of the due process standard would extend to reach the
claim asserted, which the Court described as “the claimed constitutional right
of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.” 180 In explaining why this claim
was not considered fundamental within our history and traditions, the Court
cited a long list of statutes, from the time of the Bill of Rights, from the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from recent history, that
criminalized sodomy and which, according to the Court, demonstrated that
there was no history or tradition of protecting such conduct. 181 Indeed, the
Court characterized that claim as “facetious.” 182
After Bowers, the “history and tradition” test was a favorite of
conservative members of the Court. It had the remarkable quality of always
leading to the conclusion that any asserted right was not fundamental. It was a
particular favorite of Justice Scalia. Three years after Bowers, in 1989, the

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 504-5.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 191.
See supra Section IV.B.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
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Court decided the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 183 in which a man who had
demonstrated a 98.07% probability of being the father of a child sought to
establish a legally protected relationship with the child. 184 The relevant
California statute provided that a child born to a married woman living with
her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage and that this
presumption could be rebutted only by the husband or the wife. 185 The
putative father claimed that this presumption, which had the effect of cutting
him off from his child, violated his constitutionally protected liberty interest in
his relationship with his child. 186 Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the
Court, although only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined his entire opinion. 187 The
Scalia opinion rejected the claim of the putative father and relied heavily on
the “history and traditions” test, citing both Snyder v. Massachusetts and
Moore v. East Cleveland. 188 As Scalia explained, the purpose of limiting due
process protection to traditionally protected interests was “to prevent future
generations from lightly casting aside important traditional values.” 189
Justice Scalia then applied the “traditions” test to the specific case of
parental rights before him. 190 The putative father had cited a number of
Supreme Court cases in which the Court had protected the right of an unwed
father in relation to his child. 191 The father argued that these cases established
the precedent that “a liberty interest is created by biological fatherhood plus an
established parental relationship.” 192 Justice Scalia rejected that reading of the
cases, insisting instead that the cited cases rested on “the historic respect–
indeed sanctity would not be too strong a term–traditionally accorded to the
relationships that develop within the unitary family.” 193 Upon examination of
the “traditions” involved, Justice Scalia found that there was no such tradition
protecting “the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child
born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man.” 194
In response to Justice Brennan’s dissenting view that there was in fact a
long history and tradition of protecting the parent/child relationship, 195 Justice
183. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
184. Id. at 113.
185. See id. (citing Cal. Evid. Code Ann. Sec. 621 (West Supp. 1989)).
186. Id. at 110
187. Id.
188. Id. at 123.
189. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123, n.2.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 389 (1979); Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
192. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 125.
195. Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

AN EXCESS OF METHODS

229

Scalia argued that, in determining the appropriate level of generality to be used
in identifying the relevant tradition, the Court should “refer to the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.” 196 Thus while there might be a general
tradition of protecting parent/child relationships, there was no specific tradition
of protecting the rights of an unwed father against the interests of a married
couple. 197 For Justice Scalia, the statutory presumption in the case did not
infringe on any liberty interest and thus, its propriety was “a question of
legislative policy and not constitutional law.” 198 Although Justice Scalia was
able to persuade only one of his colleagues to join his entire Michael M.
opinion, 199 he bided his time for the chance to put that view into a majority
opinion.
Four years later, in Reno v. Flores, 200 he got that opportunity. In Reno, the
Court considered a regulation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
under which alien juveniles who had been arrested and were being held for
deportation hearings could be released only to a parent or other relative but
would not automatically be released to another adult where no parent or
relative was available. 201 The effect of this rule was that juvenile aliens
without parents or adult relatives were held in custody pending their
deportation hearings. 202 The plaintiffs in the case argued that this practice
deprived them of liberty under the Due Process Clause. 203 Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion for the Court and rejected that claim. 204
Consistent with his opinion in Michael M., Justice Scalia identified the
right claimed at a very specific level–”the alleged right of a child who has no
available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the
government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able
private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected
child-care institution.” 205 Given this very specific description of the right
involved, Justice Scalia’s rejection of the claim was not at all surprising. As he

196. Id. at 127, n.6.
197. Id. at 129.
198. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129.
199. Justice Rehnquist joined in the entire Scalia opinion. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
joined in all but footnote 6 of the Scalia opinion. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
Footnote 6 was the controversial portion of the Scalia opinion in which he asserted that, under the
“history and tradition” method, the Court should describe the asserted right at the most specific
level possible.
200. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
201. Id. at 302.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 303.
205. Id at 302.
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explained, “The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that
‘substantive due process’ sustains it; the alleged right certainly cannot be
considered ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.’” 206 On the other hand, Justice Stevens, dissenting,
found the claim made by the juvenile aliens not to be a novelty at all. 207 In
Stevens’ description, the right claimed was not the very specific right of
juvenile aliens not to be detained in a very specific setting, but rather the more
general “right not to be detained in the first place.” 208 The tradition that
Stevens would cite was that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception.” 209 Thus, for Stevens, the claim
of the juvenile aliens would have been part of a protected liberty interest.
For the moment, however, Justice Scalia’s view appeared to be ascendant
and Justice Stevens’ view only a dissenting opinion. Scalia’s view again
achieved majority status four years later, in 1997, in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 210 a case in which the Court considered the claim that a statute
banning assisted suicide violated the Due Process Clause. 211 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court. 212 He said, “We begin, as we do in
all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices.” 213 As explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the “history and
traditions” method, because it is “carefully refined by concrete examples
involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal
tradition,” 214 would work to “rein in the subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due process judicial review.” 215 Justice Rehnquist then
went on to review the history and traditions involving suicide and found that,
“for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished
or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.” 216 Rehnquist
described this as “a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long
rejected the asserted right [the right to commit suicide which includes a right to
assistance in doing so], and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for
terminally ill, mentally competent adults.” 217 Thus, the Court found that
assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Reno, 507 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
Id. at 723.
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protected by the Due Process Clause. 218 Had the Court been willing to define
the tradition more broadly, as a liberty interest in “bodily integrity,” 219 an
interest that would mean that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body,” 220 then
the claim of a right to assisted suicide would have had a stronger foundation.
The Court’s most recent review of the “history and traditions” method was
in 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, 221 and it was not a good case for the proponents
of that model. In Lawrence, the Court reviewed a Texas statute that
criminalized sodomy between persons of the same sex. 222 As in Bowers, the
claim was that the statute violated the liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. 223 In the course of its opinion, the Court had to address its
earlier opinion in Bowers, which had adopted the “history and traditions” test
and which had described the tradition at a very specific level. 224 In Lawrence,
however, the Court explained: “History and tradition are the starting point but
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” 225 For
the majority in Lawrence, the starting point of history and tradition led to an
ending point that was reached only after consideration of the more relevant,
and more recent “laws and traditions in the past half century.” 226 These more
recent traditions included a line of Supreme Court cases that, taken as a whole,
led to a general principle that “there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter,” and this realm includes the private sexual conduct
of two consenting adults. 227
This majority opinion in Lawrence is a clear rejection of the “history and
traditions” model that had been espoused by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia, in
turn, sharply critiqued the majority for having departed from the Court’s
precedents. 228 According to Scalia, the only fundamental rights that qualify for
heightened scrutiny are those “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
tradition.” 229 As support for this assertion, he cited, inter alia, his own
218. Id.
219. Id. at 777. (Souter, J., concurring).
220. Id. (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
221. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
222. Id. at 564.
223. Id. at 564 (indicating that one of the three questions on which certiorari had been granted
was whether the criminal conviction violated the interests in liberty and privacy under the Due
Process Clause).
224. See infra text accompanying notes 193-95.
225. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
226. Id. at 571.
227. Id. at 578 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992)).
228. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 593.
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opinions in Reno and Michael M. 230 But the “history and tradition” model has
never been the only method the Court has used to identify implied fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause. The assertion that it has been ignores the
other methods identified in this section, as well as the implied fundamental
rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Does the History and Traditions Model Work?
Those who favor the “history and traditions” method of identifying
fundamental rights view the method as an objective means of restraining
judges from reading their subjective preferences into the Constitution. 231 Does
it really work in that way? In almost any controversial case, there are very
likely to be disagreements on the question of exactly what our traditions are.
Firstly, “our traditions” change over time. Justice Harlan, dissenting in
Poe v. Ullman 232 from the Court’s refusal to hear the case on the merits,
alluded to this difficulty. 233 Harlan spoke of the necessity of balancing the
liberty of the individual with the demands of organized society and of the need
to limit judges who might otherwise feel “free to roam where unguided
speculation might take them.” 234 The appropriate balance would be achieved,
according to Harlan, by reference to “what history teaches are the traditions
from which [this country] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke.” 235 Harlan’s reference to the two kinds of traditions–those that we
continue to practice and those that we have abandoned–demonstrate one of the
more serious problems with the use of tradition to explain constitutional
liberty. 236 America has a number of older, less savory traditions-slavery and
officially sanctioned racial segregation come most readily to mind-that have
been abandoned. At one point in time, however, each of these was part of our
county’s “history and tradition” and thus could at that time appropriately have
been used to inform the Court on the meaning of “liberty.” Of course, these
are not current traditions, but how is a court to know when a tradition is no
longer relevant to the determination of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause?
Justice Brennan did not believe that there was an effective response to the
question of when traditions gain or lose their relevance. To him, “tradition”

230. Id. In a footnote to his dissent, Justice Scalia also made the claim that, in order for a
right to be fundamental, it must be both “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition” and
“implicit in ordered liberty.” Id. at 593 n.3. That claim is not supported by many of the Court’s
fundamental rights cases.
231. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (“This approach tends to
rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial review.”).
232. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
233. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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was a concept “as malleable and as elusive as ‘liberty’ itself,” and the claim
that it served to limit judicial discretion was merely a seductive pretense. 237 In
fact, as Justice Brennan pointed out, a number of interests that previous
Supreme Court cases have identified as fundamental, such as the legal right of
married and unmarried couples to use contraceptives or the right to raise one’s
illegitimate child, were not traditionally protected when those cases were first
filed, but became so in the aftermath of the Supreme Court opinion. 238 How,
asked Brennan, is the Court “to identify the point at which a tradition becomes
firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty and the moment at which
it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer.” 239
Secondly, in addition to the problem of traditions changing over time,
courts face the historical task of establishing exactly what our traditions were
at any particular time. The Court’s opinions in Bowers and Lawrence are an
example of how two different courts can give startlingly different accounts of
the history that underlies a claimed tradition. In Bowers, the Court cited the
criminal law pertaining to sodomy during the course of American history to
support its conclusion that there was absolutely no tradition in America that
would protect what the Court called “a claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.” 240 On the other hand, seventeen
years later, in Lawrence, the Court, addressing this same question, insisted that
“there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter.” 241 As the Lawrence majority viewed earlier
sodomy laws, they were “not directed at homosexuals as such but instead
sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.” 242 Justice
Scalia, of course, disagreed with this interpretation of history. He insisted that
the historical record unimpeachably showed “a longstanding history of laws
prohibiting sodomy in general–regardless of whether it was performed by
same-sex or opposite-sex couples,” 243 and this history showed, in “utterly
unassailable” fashion, that “homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” 244
Professional historians might be able to take sides on the matter of whose
version of history is more accurate, but it does not seem prudent to have a
constitutional standard under which the question of what rights are
fundamental under our Constitution is answered, not by reference to the

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 138.
Bowers, 478 U.S. 192-93, nn.5-7.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
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Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 597.
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Constitution, but by selecting from among competing versions of historical
events. If the Court followed this theory, then, as new historical information
became available or existing historical theories were revised, fundamental
rights under the Constitution might change as well.
Thirdly, the “history and tradition” model is too easily manipulated by the
level of generality at which the Court chooses to describe a particular tradition.
This dispute about the appropriate level of generality has turned out to be
critical. If, like Justice Scalia, one chooses to define the tradition at its most
specific level, the effect in most circumstances is to reject the claim of an
implied fundamental right. If, on the other hand, one defines the tradition in
broader terms, the result is far more likely to support the finding of a
fundamental right. In each of the recent cases in which Justice Scalia has
staked out a position in opposition to the finding of an implied fundamental
right, his very specific description of that right has led to the conclusion that it
is not fundamental.
Thus, in Bowers, the majority described the tradition as involving “a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.” 245 The dissenters in
Bowers insisted that the right at issue was no more about homosexual sodomy
than “Stanley v. Georgia . . . was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
movies, or Katz v. United States . . . was about a fundamental right to place
interstate bets from a telephone booth.” 246 The dissenters would have
described the right at issue as “‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’” 247
Similarly, in Michael H., Justice Scalia described the interest involved as “the
power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a
woman’s existing marriage with another man,” and found no such right
protected by our history and traditions. 248 On the other hand, the dissenters in
Michael H. described the interest broadly as the protection of the parent/child
relationship, and they were able to point to a number of cases that protected
that right, thus demonstrating that it was part of our history and tradition. 249
Two additional examples illustrate the point further. In Reno v. Flores,
Scalia described the issue very narrowly–”the alleged right of a child who has
no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the
government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able
private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected
child-care institution,” and found that such a claimed right was not protected

245. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
246. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
248. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125.
249. Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
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by our history and traditions. 250 The dissenters in Reno described the right as
the right not to be detained without trial and found that that right was protected
by our history and traditions. 251 Finally, in Glucksberg, the majority defined
the interest at stake narrowly, as “a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so,” and found it not to be part of our
history and traditions, 252 while the dissenters would have described it more
broadly as the right of “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind . . .
to determine what shall be done with his own body,” and would have found it
part of our history and traditions and protected by the Due Process Clause. 253
In sum, it seems that there is no agreement as to how the Court should use
traditions that have changed over time, no agreement on what in fact certain
traditions were at a particular time, and no agreement on the level of generality
at which a given tradition is to be described. Without agreement on these
issues, the “history and traditions” test is far too malleable to be a helpful
constitutional guide.
D. Because They Need Protection from Government Action that Shocks the
Conscience
In 1952, in Rochin v. California, 254 the Court considered a case in which
the police had arranged to have a suspect’s stomach pumped in order to
produce evidence of illegal drugs. 255 The question was whether this kind of
conduct violated the Due Process Clause. 256 The Court initially cited both
Snyder’s “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people” test as well as
Palko’s “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” test. 257 Apparently, these
two tests were not precise enough to decide the case. Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the majority, found that the proceedings in the case where the
police forcibly extracted the contents of a suspect’s stomach constituted a kind
of conduct that “shocks the conscience” and therefore violated the Due Process
Clause. 258
It was not clear that Rochin was a substantive due process case. Since the
problem identified was part of the process of arresting and investigating the
case, it might have been considered a procedural due process case, if not a case
on compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless,
250. Reno, 507 U.S. at 302.
251. Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
253. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
254. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
255. Id. at 169.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 172.
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the Supreme Court in at least one later case has read Rochin as establishing an
implied fundamental right to some level of “bodily integrity,” 259 thus
suggesting that it establishes a substantive rather than a procedural standard.
Rochin is a hard case to explain. Its “shocks the conscience” standard hardly
provides any sort of objective standard that would make police conduct subject
to review by courts in a consistent way. To the extent that Rochin was a case
of substantive due process, it certainly is strange to describe a protected
“liberty” interest, not by reference to the interest protected, but rather by
reference to a certain kind of outrageous conduct on the part of the
government. In any case, Rochin for a long time appeared to be a relatively
minor case of merely historical interest, until 1998, when the Court brought it
back to life in County of Sacramento v. Lewis. 260
In Lewis, a high-speed police chase resulted in the death of one of those
being chased. 261 In the lawsuit that followed, the Supreme Court described the
issue as “whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or
reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase.” 262 The Court’s
ultimate answer was no, but in the course of its opinion, it explained that the
appropriate standard to use in determining whether “abusive executive
action” 263 violates the Due Process Clause is the “shocks the conscience” test
from Rochin, which the Court described, surprisingly, as having been
“repeatedly adhered to” in the years since Rochin. 264 The Court then tried to
give some objective content to what certainly seems to be an extremely vague
and subjective standard. 265 According to the Court, in determining whether
police conduct in a high-speed chase “shocks the conscience” and is therefore
a violation of substantive due process, neither negligence on the part of the
police was sufficient, nor deliberate indifference, but only an “intent to harm
suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight.” 266
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, finding no violation of
substantive due process, but, of course, disagreed with the Court’s use of the
“shocks the conscience” test. 267 As noted earlier, in Scalia’s view, the only
liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause were those “deeply
rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.” 268 In what may well be his most

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
Id. at 836.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 846.
Id at 846-47.
Id. at 854.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854.
Id. at 861.
See supra Section IV.C.
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entertaining opinion, Justice Scalia cited Cole Porter in comparing the
majority’s over-the-top opinion with Porter’s examples of top-shelf icons, such
as “the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane,” 269 and
insisted that the majority had resuscitated the “ne plus ultra . . . of subjectivity,
th’ ol’ ‘shocks-the-conscience’ test.” 270
After Lewis, the “ol’ shocks-the-conscience” test can no longer be regarded
as a mere historical relic. Although it is also now clear that the Rochin test is a
substantive due process test, it is not clear how this analysis fits with the
Court’s general jurisprudence of implied fundamental rights. Although Justice
Scalia treated the issue as one of identifying an implied fundamental right as in
Glucksberg, 271 the Lewis majority spoke of due process as “protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of the government,” 272 a test that makes no
reference to fundamental rights. As for the future effect of Lewis, it is quite
possible that the Court will limit its “shocks-the-conscience” test to cases of
alleged police misconduct, the factual settings of both Rochin and Lewis.
E.

Structural Arguments: Because They Are Necessarily Implied from the
Structure of the Federal Government or from the Structure of the
Constitution
1. Implied from the Structure of the Federal Government

In 1969, the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson 273 considered an equal
protection challenge to a durational residence requirement under which new
residents of Connecticut could not receive welfare benefits until they had lived
in the state for at least one year. 274 The Court applied a heightened standard of
review–“any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a
constitutional] right [must be] shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.” 275 The constitutional right at issue here was the “right
to travel interstate.” Of course, no right to travel is explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution. Since this was an equal protection case, the Court could not
attach the claimed right to the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause, but
that was not a problem. The Court indicated that it had “no occasion to ascribe
the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional

269. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 862 (“Adhering to our decision in Glucksberg, rather than ask whether the police
conduct here at issue shocks my unelected conscience, I would ask whether our Nation has
traditionally protected the right respondents assert.”).
272. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
273. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
274. Id. at 634.
275. Id.
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provision.” 276 Instead, the Court in effect found a freestanding implied right to
travel. 277 Its source was not any particular provision in the Constitution itself.
Rather, the idea of the right to travel is “fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union.” 278
There is logic to this assertion. The pre-Constitutional Articles of
Confederation did indeed contain an express right to travel between the
states. 279 The confederacy created by the Articles was much weaker than the
subsequent federal union, since the states that established that confederacy
retained full sovereignty, and thus without explicit protection, it was not
certain that persons were free to travel between these sovereign states. On the
other hand, when thirteen sovereign states came together in 1787 to form the
United States of America, in that new, more powerful federal union, the states
gave up some of their sovereign status. This new Union would not have been
possible, and would have made no sense, unless citizens of that Union were
free to travel from one end of it to another. Just as the state constitution of
Connecticut needs no explicit provision to create a right to travel between New
Haven and Hartford, so the federal Constitution did not need an explicit
provision to create a right to travel between New Haven and New York City.
In both cases, the concept of sovereignty necessarily includes a fundamental
right to travel within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. Thus, the structure of the
federal union implies a fundamental right to interstate travel.
Notwithstanding the necessity in a federal union of a right to travel, the
Court’s opinion in Shapiro is surprisingly cavalier in its assertion that it need
not identify a constitutional source for that right. The Court made no reference
to “history and traditions,” and no appeal to what is “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” (although it must be said that, since Shapiro was not a due
process case, there was no need to cite those precedents). Shapiro has the feel
of a case decided in a separate universe, a universe where there is no Lochner,
no line of selective incorporation cases, and no history of implied fundamental
rights cases under the Equal Protection Clause. Shapiro reaches what is surely
the proper result with its reliance on the structure of government to find an
implied fundamental right, but, in terms of constitutional method, it is a case
unto itself.
Recently, the Court has narrowed this kind of structural argument as it
applies to the implied fundamental right to travel. In 1999, in Saenz v. Roe, 280
the Court reviewed a California statute that, like the one in Shapiro, limited

276. Id. at 630.
277. Id.
278. Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
279. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, ART. IV (“The people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State.”).
280. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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welfare benefits to new state residents during their first year of residence.281
Unlike the statute in Shapiro, however, the California statute did not deny
benefits completely during that period but rather limited the amount of the
benefit to a level no higher than the claimant could have received in his or her
previous state of residence. 282 The California statute was designed to address
the argument in Shapiro that the failure to offer any benefit at all during that
one-year period was a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel. 283 The
Court in Saenz saw no constitutional difference between the two statutes and
invalidated California’s. 284 In its opinion, however, the Court gave a narrower,
more nuanced explanation of the constitutional source of the right to travel. 285
According to the Court, the right to interstate travel is made up of three
different components, and each of these components has a different source. 286
The first component-the right of a citizen of one state to cross state borders
into another state-is, as in Shapiro, “a necessary concomitant of the stronger
Union the Constitution created.” 287 The second and third components of the
right to travel had different origins. The second component–the right, by
virtue of state citizenship, to travel temporarily to another state and “be treated
as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien”–is protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. 288 The third component-the
right, by virtue of being a citizen of the United States, to elect to become a
resident of another state and be treated like other citizens of that State-is
protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 289 Thus, after Saenz v. Roe, there are three components of the
right to travel between states, and only one needs to be implied. The second
and third are now identified as explicit constitutional rights that need not be
implied from the concept of the federal Union.
The method of implying a fundamental right to travel from the structure of
the federal Union is a sound one, but it does not appear to be a method that can
be generalized beyond the one specific right to travel. Thus, the Court has not
made use of this method of implying fundamental rights for any other right,
nor does it seem possible to use it as a foundation for a general theory of
identifying implied fundamental rights.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 493.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
Id. at 501 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
Id. at 500.
Id. at 502-03.
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2. Implied from the Structure of the Constitution
In 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 290 determined that a
Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by married
couples was unconstitutional. 291 Griswold is widely viewed as a significant
linchpin in the development of substantive due process cases that led to Roe v.
Wade and Lawrence v. Texas. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Griswold was
not a due process decision. In fact, Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court
took great pains to note that the Court was not following Lochner as precedent
nor was it basing its decision on the “liberty” interest in the Due Process
Clause. 292 Instead Justice Douglas, in a much criticized opinion, spoke of the
“penumbras formed by emanations” 293 from the guarantees of specific kinds of
privacy in the Bill of Rights and used these “penumbras formed by
emanations” as a basis for finding a more generalized, more encompassing
right of privacy. 294 This right of privacy included the freedom of a married
couple to use contraceptives within the sanctity of their bedroom without the
interference of the state. 295
Justice Douglas’s decision to use the terms “penumbras” and “emanations”
was not a happy one. That language opened him up to the criticism that his use
of sloppy, vague language led to a sloppy, vague constitutional result that was
not tethered to any particular provision in the Constitution. 296 Griswold
appears to have created a freestanding, free-floating constitutional right. So
the critique goes. It is difficult to argue in favor of Justice Douglas’s choice of
the terms “penumbra” and “emanations,” but his opinion does contain a
defensible constitutional theory of implied fundamental rights.
Justice Douglas examined five provisions of the Bill of Rights that create
specific enforceable zones of privacy into which the government may not
enter. 297 He identified the right of association protected by the First
290. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
291. Id. at 481-82.
292. Id. (“Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that
Lochner v. State of New York . . . should be our guide. But we decline that invitation as we did
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.”).
293. Id. at 484.
294. Id. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”).
295. Id. at 485-86.
296. See, e.g., Saenz, 381 U.S. at 508-09 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The Court talks about a
constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions
forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there
is not. . . . ‘Privacy’ is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in
meaning but which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban
against many things other than searches and seizures.”).
297. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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Amendment, the prohibition of quartering soldiers from the Third Amendment,
the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” in the Fourth Amendment,
the protection against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the
Ninth Amendment’s specific recognition that the enumeration of certain rights
in the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.” 298 As Justice Douglas viewed these Amendments, while each
created a specific area of privacy into which government may not enter, they
also, taken together, created a structure under which government is limited in
the extent to which it can invade the private areas of a person’s life. 299 The
view that the particular areas of privacy protected by the specific amendments
are part of a larger, more general right to privacy is strengthened by the Ninth
Amendment’s specific language to this effect. Douglas is effectively asking,
“Can you imagine a Constitution under which the government cannot, without
a warrant, come into your home to search for drugs but has the even more
intrusive power to dictate to a married couple what they do in the bedroom of
that home?” Looking to future controversies, Douglas might have asked, “Can
you imagine a Constitution under which the government does not have the
power to specify with whom you may associate, but is able to dictate who your
sexual partners may be and what sexual activity, with a consenting adult
partner, you are allowed to engage in?”
Although the Griswold case is an extremely important case on the road to
Roe and Lawrence, Justice Douglas’s reasoning in Griswold has been given
little precedential weight. But the idea that one can identify implied
fundamental rights from the structure of the Constitution is a valid one,
including the idea that one can imply a general right from a series of specific
rights. However, like Shapiro’s argument from the structure of government,
Griswold’s argument from the structure of the Constitution has been
subsequently ignored by the Court.
F.

Because They Provide Necessary Access to Governmental Processes

The Court has found that there is an implied fundamental right to vote and
an implied fundamental right to some level of access to court processes. The
justification for these fundamental rights is that legislation and adjudication in
the courts are essential elements of a democracy and that a limitation on access
to these two institutions is a threat to the institution of government itself.

298. Id. at 484.
299. Id.
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1. Access to the Legislature
As far back as 1938, in United States v. Carolene Products, 300 the Court
stated in its famous footnote 4 that the deference courts ordinarily gave to
legislative enactments might not be appropriate in reviewing legislation that
“restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation.” 301 The dictum of this footnote was
translated into holding in 1964 in Reynolds v. Sims, 302 a case in which the
Supreme Court invalidated the method of electing the two houses of the
Alabama legislature from geographic districts that had wildly uneven
populations and thus disproportionate weight attached to each vote. 303 In
explaining why it would give heightened scrutiny to this method of electing the
legislature, the Court first cited Skinner, since like the law at issue in that case,
the restriction on voting touched on “a sensitive and important area of human
rights” and it “involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man.” 304 The Court
then went on from this vague and general reference to the right’s being
“important” and “basic” to explain why the right to vote was fundamental. 305
Voting is a fundamental right because “the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights.” 306 Because the right to vote is fundamental, “any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.” 307 The Court then used this heightened scrutiny not only to
invalidate the disproportionate voting system in Reynolds, but also, in later
cases, to invalidate other state restrictions on the right to vote, including a poll
tax, 308 a requirement of owning or possessing land as a voter qualification,309 a
one-year residency requirement, 310 and a restrictive rule that made it hard for
third parties to get access to the ballot. 311
There is no question that the protection of access to voting is essential for
democracy to work so this “protecting access to the legislature” model is an
effective explanation of this particular fundamental right. It is, on the other
hand, not the kind of model that can be generalized into a theory about implied
fundamental rights, other than in the one other closely connected context,

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Id.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S 23 (1968).
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access to the court system. 312 The Court, however, has not always made it
clear how this particular model is to be applied in voting rights cases. For
example, in Bush v. Gore, 313 the Court found a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause in the manner in which Florida was counting ballots in the
2000 presidential election, yet did not make clear what standard of review it
was using. 314 Further, the Court purported to limit its ruling to the specific
facts before it. 315 So although the right to vote is fundamental, the exact
mechanism for courts to use in protecting this right is not clear.
2. Access to the Courts
Since 1956, the Court has applied some kind of heightened scrutiny in
reviewing challenges to the denial of access to the courts in criminal cases. In
Griffin v. Illinois, 316 the Court, on both equal protection and due process
grounds, invalidated a state scheme in Illinois under which convicted
defendants who could not afford a transcript of the trial proceedings lost the
right to appeal. 317 As the Court explained, “a State is not required by the
Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review
at all,” 318 but once the state has established such a system, the state could not
limit its availability in a way that discriminated on account of poverty. 319 The
Griffin Court did not use any of the terminology that we have since come to
associate with this area of the law, such as “implied fundamental right,” “strict
scrutiny,” or “compelling interest,” nor did it announce any formal method for
determining when a right is fundamental. The Court did, in commonsense
terms, explain why access to the appellate process was important–since it was
important for the “correct adjudication of guilt or innocence.” 320 As the Court
pointed out, “a substantial proportion of criminal convictions are reversed by
state appellate courts.” 321 Thus, the opportunity to prove to an appellate court

312. See infra Section IV.F.2.
313. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
314. Cf. id. at 104 (“When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its
people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to
each voter.”), with id. at 105 (“The recount mechanisms . . . do not satisfy the minimum
requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right.”).
315. Id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
316. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
317. Id. at 18.
318. Id. at 18.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 18-19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

244

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:203

that a conviction in the trial court was wrong has some kind of fundamental
status. 322
In 1971, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 323 the Court broadened to some extent
the fundamental right of access to courts by including certain civil cases. 324
The plaintiffs in Boddie were welfare recipients challenging the required fees
they had to pay in order to file divorce actions. 325 The Court decided the case
on due process grounds, and, to some extent, the Court’s heightened scrutiny
depended on the resulting infringement of the fundamental right to marriage,
which included a right to terminate that marriage. 326 The case was also about
access to the courts as a fundamental matter, at least where the state has,
through its court system, monopolized the means for adjusting legal
relationships. 327 As the Court explained, “due process reflects a fundamental
value in our American constitutional system,” 328 and “[i]t is to courts, or other
quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of
a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.” 329 Thus, where the state
has through its court system monopolized the method of dispute settlement, as
is the case for divorce, then some right of access to the court system is
fundamental. 330 On the other hand, the Court has made clear that, as a general
rule, fee requirements in civil cases ordinarily are examined only for
rationality. 331 It appears that it is only where access to the courts in a civil
matter involves some other fundamental interest, like marriage or the
parent/child relationship, 332 or where the state has given the courts a monopoly
on resolving a particular kind of dispute, that the Court will apply a heightened
scrutiny. 333
The “access to the courts” justification for identifying fundamental rights
does not seem to produce any wrong decisions, but it will never be an
important building block for a general system of implied fundamental rights.
There is first the problem that “access to the courts” arguments are more
obviously about procedure than substance and are more easily viewed as
questions of procedural due process. Second, the two specific substantive
justifications that the Court has used to support the fundamental nature of
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Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374-5.
Id.
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
Id.
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
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access to the court–the desire to get things right and the monopolization of
certain dispute settlement procedures–are very difficult to generalize beyond
these particular factual settings.
G. Because Previous Supreme Court Precedents Identify Them
The search for the source, or sources, of implied fundamental rights is
usually seen to be a search for first principles, that is, basic principles outside
the Constitution and outside previous Court decisions that can justify the
identification of certain rights as fundamental. Thus, for example, we have the
“history and traditions” test and the “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
test. However, in recent years, in three of the Court’s most significant
decisions, 334 the Court has engaged in a more modest kind of reasoning. It has
not attempted to establish first principles from outside the Constitution but
rather has accepted as given previous Supreme Court cases and attempted to
use the specific holdings of those cases to establish a more generalized
principle of privacy as a fundamental right.
In Roe v. Wade, 335 the Court began by conceding that “[t]he Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” 336 Then, without citation to
any general theory of implied fundamental rights, it went on to cite “a line of
decisions . . . going back perhaps as far as [1891]” 337 in which “the Court has
recognized that a certain right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” 338 The Court
then cited thirteen cases falling into two sets. The first seven identified
possible sources of the right to privacy in the Constitution, 339 and the next six
identified certain aspects of privacy that were protected. 340 At that point,
without choosing any one of the previously cited methods for identifying the
right, and without relying on any one of the previously cited aspects of the
right, the Court drew the general conclusion that these previous cases, although
specific in the kinds of privacy protected, were best understood as recognizing

334. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 833 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
335. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
336. Id. at 152.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Olmstead v.
United States, 2777 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
340. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971) (contraception); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (child rearing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
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a broad and generalized right to privacy that is part of Fourteenth Amendment
“liberty.” 341 This right of privacy included within it “a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 342 This is the kind of legal
reasoning that historically was used by common law judges to establish general
legal principles from previous specific cases that served as precedents. 343
Nineteen years after Roe, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 344 a plurality opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter reviewed the precedential value of Roe v. Wade. 345 In doing so, the
plurality gave great weight to the Court’s earlier precedents, without any
appeal to underlying theories of where fundamental rights come from. 346
Rather, the plurality emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis as crucial to their
conclusion that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and
once again reaffirmed.” 347 The plurality explained that “the reservations any
of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the
explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of
stare decisis.” 348 The Casey plurality thus used the earlier Supreme Court
precedents, particularly Roe, and the formal doctrine of stare decisis to explain
the nature of the fundamental right of privacy as it relates to abortion.
Eleven years later, the Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas 349 used a
similar kind of case-specific reasoning to provide authority for an implied
fundamental right. 350 The Lawrence Court first made reference to the “liberty”
interest that had been identified in the Pierce, Meyer, Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe line of cases. 351 The Court viewed these cases as having established
(1) that “the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends
beyond the marital relationship;” 352 (2) that liberty includes “the right of a
woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny;” 353 and
(3) that this liberty includes a “substantive dimension of fundamental

341. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
342. Id. at 153.
343. The development of the contract doctrine of consideration is a good example of courts
developing a general doctrine over time on the basis of a series of particular cases. For a
discussion of the historical development of the consideration doctrine, see E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 14-19 (2004).
344. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 849.
347. Id. at 846.
348. Id. at 852.
349. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
350. Id. at 564-65.
351. Id. at 564-65.
352. Id. at 565.
353. Id.
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significance in defining the rights of the person.” 354 In light of these
precedents, the Lawrence Court determined that Bowers v. Hardwick had been
incorrectly decided and had to be overruled, since its penalties and purposes
attempted to regulate “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in
the most private of places, the home.” 355
The use of previous cases as precedents rather than an appeal to broad first
principles can be viewed as a modest form of judicial reasoning that does not
attempt to make new law but only to discern how existing law applies in a new
factual setting. Of course, critics of Roe and Lawrence would say that the
Court went well beyond previous precedents rather than simply applying them,
but that would be a criticism of the particular use of this method in these cases,
rather than a general critique of this method as a form of constitutional
reasoning. There still is one unanswerable criticism of this method–how does
the Court get its precedents in the first place? That is, by the time of Roe, there
was a history of implied fundamental rights cases from which the Court could
select relevant precedents that would help decide the current case. How had
the Courts that decided those earlier cases, without the benefit of precedents,
identified implied fundamental rights? The method of reasoning from existing
precedents can work in a mature system that has already decided enough
relevant cases to serve as precedents, but such a method could never justify the
original precedents.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has no general theory of implied
fundamental rights under the Constitution. That should come as no surprise,
given that the Court is a multi-member body that changes over time and can
decide only the particular case before it. What the Court does have is a series
of methods that it uses in particular cases. In the ordinary course, the Court
tends to treat the due process and equal protection cases as independent of each
other. Thus, the “history and traditions” test, the “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” test, and the “shocks the conscience” test are used only under
the Due Process Clause. On the other hand, the societal importance test, the
structural test, and the access to governmental processes test are ordinarily
used in equal protection cases. 356 The “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution” test was developed in an equal protection case, but it
effectively overlaps the due process “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
test. Nevertheless, having established separate tests for identifying
fundamental rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the
354. Id.
355. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
356. But see supra Section IV.E.2, which shows the Court using a structural test in an area
other than equal protection.
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Court tends to treat them as interchangeable when such treatment serves its
purposes.
As for the merits of the tests, none of them is entirely satisfactory. The
three Due Process tests-”implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” “history
and traditions,” and “shocks the conscience”–all have the benefit of being
broad theories of general applicability. However, the first of these suffers from
the defect of being so vague and circular that it does not at all advance the
discussion about the source of implied fundamental rights. The second suffers
from the defect that there is no agreement on what our history and traditions
are and which ones count and at what level of generality. The third suffers
from the defect of beings a standardless, subjective methodology. The method
of relying on previous Supreme Court precedents to identify fundamental
rights in new settings is a workable method, but only if one accepts the
question-begging use of earlier precedents that do not themselves adequately
explain the source of the alleged right.
The structural and access analyses that the Court has used under the Equal
Protection Clause do not suffer from the defects of vagueness, subjectivity, or
disputes over history, but none of them is capable of being generalized to form
a broader theory. Thus, the structure of a federal government argument is quite
adequate to explain the implied fundamental right to cross state lines, but
nothing beyond that. The access to governmental processes method works to
explain the fundamental rights to vote and to have some level of access to the
courts but, once again, does not seem capable of being generalized into a
theory. On the other hand, the more general test of societal importance seems
too vague and subjective to constitute a valid constitutional theory.
So where does that leave us? Not in a very satisfactory position. Perhaps
the very idea that courts, and therefore judges, are capable of creating an
objective, defensible, constitutionally-based method and theory for identifying
implied fundamental rights is implausible. A search for an “implied”
constitutional right is, by definition, a search for something that cannot be
found in the Constitution, but surely the rights themselves exist. The very
concept of government in America involves limits on government power and
corresponding protections of individual liberty. The Ninth Amendment makes
clear that the drafters of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights were quite
certain that not all of the individual rights that are protected from government
intrusion find explicit protection in the Constitution. What this means is that
courts, and therefore judges, have no choice but to fill in the blanks. This
article is an account of the methods the Supreme Court has used in its
necessary task of filling in the blanks.

